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WILL SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE REMAIN 







Yes, subject to concerns about Medicare inefficiencies and potentially self-confirming 
skepticism. The U.S. social security system-broadly defined to include Medicare-faces 
significant financial problems as the result of an aging population. But demographic change is 
also likely to raise savings, increase wages, and reduce interest rates, and up to a point, a 
growing GDP-share of medical spending is an efficient response to an aging population. Thus 
viability is more a political economy than an economic feasibility issue. To examine the 
political viability of social security, I focus on intertemporal cost-benefit tradeoffs in a median 
voter setting. For a variety of assumptions and policy alternatives, I find that social security 
should retain majority support. 
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This is an updated and shortened version of my 1998 Carnegie-Rochester conference paper (Bohn 
1999). At the time, the paper was received with great skepticism. While most of the conference 
audience seemed convinced that social security reform was imminent, the paper’s voting analysis 
suggested that a majority will rationally support the existing pay-as-you-go programs. Five years later, 
no reforms have occurred. The political debate is dominated instead by proposals for new Medicare 
drug benefits, suggesting voter preferences favor expanded pay-as-you-go programs over cost-
reducing reforms. This update re-examines the viability of social security on the basis of current, much 
different fiscal and economic projections. The results are similar, even strengthened because of lower 
interest rates and deflated stock market expectations. 
 
1. Introduction 
The U.S. social security system—broadly defined to include Medicare—faces tremendous financial 
problems as the population is aging. According to Social Security Administration (SSA) projections, 
the ratio of workers to retirees will fall from 3.9 in 2003 to 2.4 in 2035 (Fig. 1). The cost of retirement 
benefits (OASI) will rise from 3.8% of GDP in 2003 to 5.5% by 2035 (Fig. 2). Medicare cost are 
projected to grow even faster, from 2.5% to 5% of GDP by 2035. Though long run projections are 
always uncertain, the underlying demographics are firmly in place: The growth rate of the labor force 
has declined sharply (Fig. 3) and life-expectancy is rising (Fig. 4).  
  Not surprisingly, these alarming projections have created doubts about the system’s viability. 
According to opinion polls, many young Americans do not expect to receive any social security 
benefits when they are old. Economists have voiced similar concerns. Some have concluded that 
continuing social security is simply infeasible (e.g., President’s Commission to Strengthen Social 
Security, 2001); others are mainly thinking about alternative versions of radical reforms, apparently 
taking the existing system’s demise for granted.  
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Figure 1
The Ratio of Workers to Beneficiaries: 
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Notes: The chart illustrates the rapid decline in the worker-retiree ratio between now and 2035 under the SSA (2003) 
Intermediate Projection. The OASDI series is lower than the OASI series because it includes the disabled. See Section 2 
for more explanation. 
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Figure 2
Retirement (OASI) and Medicare Cost 
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Notes: From SSA (2003), Intermediate Projection. 
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Figure 3 
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Notes: Historical data and alternative projections from SSA (2003). 
4  
Figure 4 
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Notes: Average of male and female life expectancy, historical data and alternative projections from SSA (2003). 
 
5  
  Though the social security debate sometimes focuses narrowly on retirement, this paper 
examines retirement and retiree medical insurance together. This is because OASI and Medicare share 
the same payroll tax, have common beneficiaries, and raise similar public choice issues. To anticipate, 
I find that despite the rising cost, social security remains viable, economically and politically. To the 
extent caveats are required, the most likely source of trouble is Medicare and not retirement 
insurance.1
  The biggest challenge in modeling social security is perhaps the lack of consensus about the 
basic nature of the system. Does the government have an obligation—moral or otherwise—to take care 
of retirees who previously contributed to social security? If so, does this “entitlement” include an 
open-ended promise to cover all “necessary” medical expenses even when health care cost are rising 
sharply? Or is social security just a transfer program that Congress could repeal at any time?  
  Such interpretational questions are especially relevant for social security because the existing 
laws do not provide a coherent plan for the future. Instead, the law specifies fixed benefits and fixed 
tax rates, which are almost surely inconsistent in the long run and must be modified periodically to 
adapt to changing circumstances. The question to what extent benefits and taxes can be adjusted 
within the system is therefore important for the system’s overall viability.  
  When discussing changes, the interpretation of promised benefits is a key issue. To those who 
believe that social security represents an irrevocable obligation, the question of viability is about 
economic feasibility, about honoring a moral commitment, and not about politics. To discuss the 
politics of terminating social security might even be viewed as immoral, no less outrageous than a 
debate about defaulting on Treasury bills. To those who consider social security a transfer program 
without meaningful intertemporal dimension, questions about viability are entirely about politics, 
                                                      
1 I should emphasize that the paper is not about the normative desirability of marginal, system-saving adjustments versus 
more fundamental social security reforms, nor primarily about forecasting the future of social security. While a negative 
answer to the viability question should strongly affect expectations and may create momentum for reform, a positive answer 
does not rule out that voters might prefer some other alternative to the status quo. The challenge for reformers is to convince 
voters without using the cheap argument that reforms are inevitable.  
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about the odds that social security retains majority support; and any comment about moral obligations 
might be viewed as unscientific or politically naive.2
  All sides apparently agree that Congress is legally sovereign and has the ability to modify 
social security at will. Hence, majority support is a necessary condition for the existence of social 
security. From this perspective, the politics of social security should be a legitimate topic even if one 
views social security as a moral commitment.3 On the other hand, if one views social security as 
discretionary, an economic analysis of voter behavior cannot ignore that rational voters have to form 
expectations about the likely voting behavior of others. This creates a potential for multiple equilibria 
and for public debate—perhaps revolving around moral obligations—to serve as an equilibrium 
selection mechanism. From this perspective, social security can be given an intertemporal dimension 
without assuming a moral commitment. 
  Thus, the viability question is ultimately political. Is social security likely to maintain majority 
support as the population ages? To obtain robust answers, I will examine several different political-
economy models. Purely economic concerns play a role in this context as voters weigh the cost and 
benefits of social security: How expensive would it be to continue the current system? Is it even 
feasible? To put the politics in context, I first examine the allocational implications of an aging 
population and of rising medical cost. The main points are (a) that aging has basically favorable 
implications—increasing the savings rate, wages, and the capital-labor ratio—and (b) that an efficient 
allocation will likely display a growing GDP-share of medical spending.  
                                                      
2 Politicians seem to pick the best of both views, telling workers that payroll taxes entitle them to retirement benefits, but 
denying that the promised benefits should appear as liabilities in the budget (see Bohn 1992, 1997). 
3 Note that Congressional sovereignty cannot be used to dismiss the moral commitment view of social security because a 
sovereign Congress could also default on government bonds. Since entitlements are paid out automatically while it takes an 
act of Congress to raise the statutory debt ceiling, it would actually take a stronger political consensus among House, Senate, 
and President to end social security than to default on the national debt. Pursuing the analogy with debt, it is worth knowing 
under what conditions a government might default on bonds, even if one views the idea of defaulting on government bonds 
as outrageous. The same argument applies to social security. 
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  Thereafter I examine the politics of social security. Two key issues are altruism and the 
intertemporal dimension of the social security system. Altruism is almost too powerful to be 
interesting: Social security is obviously viable if the young are eager to make transfers to the old. But 
if social security were based on pure altruism, why should high-income workers receive higher 
transfers in retirement than low-income workers? The linkage between benefits and prior contributions 
suggests that intertemporal arguments play a role. Hence, I will focus on intertemporal models of 
social security and, to make it challenging, abstract from operational altruism.4  
  In any intertemporal model of social security, the main task is to explain why working-age 
voters can rationally expect future benefits in exchange for their current transfers to retirees. 
Following Cooley and Soarez (1996, 1999), I interpret the intertemporal linkage as a repeated voting 
game with trigger strategies. To support social security as a sequential equilibrium, one has to show 
that for the median-age voter the present value of future benefits exceeds the value of payroll taxes 
until retirement. In a partial equilibrium setting, I find that the net present value (NPV) of social 
security is positive for the median voter (about age 45) for a variety of specifications. General 
equilibrium arguments provide additional support for social security, because a vote against social 
security would raise the capital-labor ratio and reduce interest rates, making private savings a less 
attractive alternative to social security. Overall, Cooley and Soarez’ (1999) approach provides 
substantial evidence in favor of viability, contrary to their own (1996) conclusions.  
  Throughout the political-economy analysis, the criterion for viability is that social security 
finds majority support at all times against the alternative of ending social security. To limit the scope 
of the paper, I do not explicitly examine more elaborate transition paths or reforms that replace social 
security with some other government-sponsored retirement system. I show, however, that social 
                                                      
4 It is important to distinguish between operational altruism supporting transfers on the margin and “latent” altruism that 
might become operational if social security ever lost majority support. While I doubt that the current benefit structure can be 
justified by altruism, the existence of general welfare and SSI (supplemental social security) suggests latent altruism. This is 
important for the politics of social security because the young gain less from abolishing social security if most retirees would 
still be entitled to SSI benefits (presumably motivated by altruism towards the poor). 
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security gains substantial voter support if partial payments to current retirees would be continued after 
a no vote. Since the reform plans in the current policy debate largely protect current retirees, the paper 
suggests that their political prospects are either doubtful or really due to other features (e.g., implicit 
capital-income tax reform via tax-favored retirement accounts).  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the demographic and financial trends. 
Section 3 examines efficiency issues with particular emphasis on Medicare. Section 4 considers 
intertemporal models of social security without operational altruism. Section 5 briefly comments on 
other considerations. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The Demographic Problem 
The aging of the U.S. population is driven by two main forces, declining birth rates and increasing 
life-expectancy. Both of these demographic changes increase the ratio of social security beneficiaries 
to workers. Their economic effects are somewhat different. At a fixed life-expectancy, declining 
fertility would reduce the number of workers per retiree, but not the expected time each person spends 
in retirement. Rising life-expectancy increases the length of retirement and therefore the per-capita 
cost. The per-capita cost increases are especially severe for Medicare because medical cost are 
increasing with age.  
  While the demographic projections until about 2030-40 are relatively clear—the 20-year 
ahead labor force has already been born—there is considerable uncertainty about further-ahead 
projections. As is common in the literature, I focus on the SSA’s Intermediate Projection as the 
baseline forecast and use their alternative projections as a suggestive measure of uncertainty. 
  Figures 3-5 show the SSA’s three alternative projections for the growth rate of the labor force, 
the life expectancy at age 65 (averaged male and female), and the ratio of retirees to contributors. In 
all cases, the population growth rate is expected to stabilize once the baby boom has passed through, 
but at different levels depending on the projection. Life expectancy, in contrast, is rising persistently 
but slowly. Combining the two trends, the ratio of retirees to contributors will increase sharply 
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between 2010 and 2035 as the baby boom retires. The path beyond 2035 is more uncertain, but the 
growth seems to slow down considerably, except in the most pessimistic alternative. 
 
Figure 5 
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Notes: Historical data and alternative projections from SSA (2003). 
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  The financial implications are best examined separately for the different components of the 
social security system. Fig.6 shows the projected rise in the cost of retirement benefits as share of 
GDP. Because the cost rises while revenues/GDP are constant or slightly declining, the OASI program 
faces a funding shortfall around 2018. In the baseline projection, the funding gap grows quickly until 
about 2035, then stabilizes at 1.5-2% of GDP.5 The alternative projections show similar paths until 
2040 and then diverge, as uncertainty increases with the forecast horizon. Except in the most 
pessimistic case, cost/GDP stops rising after about 2035, consistent with the demographic trends. 
In terms of economic feasibility, a 1.5-2% funding gap is serious, but far from insurmountable, 
especially with more than a quarter century advance warning. (It’s not uncommon for Congress to 
debate fiscal changes impacting 2% of GDP.) Beyond 2035, cost increases are largely due to slow 
growth in life-expectancy. This suggests that a one-time adjustment covering the 1.5% funding gap of 
2035 plus an indexation of retirement age to life-expectancy should sufficient to stabilize the OASI 
cost rate permanently. 
  The projections for Medicare look much more troubling in comparison. Fig.7 shows the 
projected outlays and revenues of the hospital insurance fund (HI, a.k.a. Medicare Part A). Revenues 
are insufficient even in the most optimistic scenario. In the intermediate case, the HI benefit cost as 
fraction of GDP will almost double by 2035, and total Medicare cost (Parts A&B, as shown in Fig. 2) 
will exceed the cost of retirement insurance. More ominously, the ratio of Medicare cost to GDP 
shows no sign of stabilizing; by 2080, HI cost is projected to exceed HI revenues by a 3:1 ratio. 
Because OASI and Medicare are subject to similar demographic pressures, the relative growth of 
Medicare must be attributed to increased per-capita medical spending. These projections suggests that 
                                                      
5 Until about 2040, the projected OASDI cash-flow shortfall could be covered from the social security trust fund. But since 
the trust fund holds Treasury securities, its value is questionable (see below). The disability component (DI) of OASDI is 
excluded for most of my analysis, because DI covers the working age population and is therefore not an intergenerational 
program. DI financing is also unbalanced because projected outlays of about 2.5% of payroll by 2030 well exceed the 
program’s fixed 1.8% of payroll revenue base.  
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studies of intergenerational redistribution should pay at least as much attention to Medicare as to 
retirement insurance. 
Figure 6 
Outlays and Revenue of the Retirement Insuranc Fund 
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Notes: Projections from SSA (2003). Trust fund transactions and taxes on benefits are excluded. 
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Figure 7 
Outlays and Revenue of the Hospital Insurance Fund (HI) 
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Notes: Projections from SSA (2003). Trust fund transactions and taxes on benefits are excluded. 
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  These trends raise a number of questions. First, what are the economic consequences if the 
growing cost of social security is financed through rising taxes on the young? Second, is it politically 
viable to continue social security? If voters care about cost-benefit tradeoffs, the answer will depend 
on the economic consequences, but it is ultimately a question about politics.  
3. Efficient Responses to Demographic Change 
This section examines some basic economic questions about demographic change: What are the 
macroeconomic effects of lower population growth and higher life expectancy? How are they 
modified in the presence of social security? And how should we interpret the rising GDP-share of 
Medicare? The answers may surprise those who see demographic change as a huge problem: Lower 
population growth and rise life-expectancy will raise wages and reduce interest rates even if rising 
taxes crowd out capital. A growing GDP-share of medical spending is an efficient response to these 
demographic changes. And after one generation, welfare is unambiguously improved. 
3.1 Demographic Change without Government 
For the basic analysis, consider a standard Diamond (1965) two-period OG model. Generation t 
consists of Nt members who consume and work (earning  ) in period   and retire in period  wt t t +1. 
Individuals survive into retirement with probability µt+1, which is also the aggregate, deterministic 
fraction of survivors. Individuals have utility  
  Ut  =  u(ct
1)  +  ρ⋅µt+1⋅ u(ct+1
2 ) (1) 




1 + t c ρ  is a discount factor; u  is 
increasing, concave, and (to obtain a steady state) homothetic.  
  With stochastic survival, the availability of annuities is important for savings decisions. If fair 
annuities are available, a market interest rate   translates into a survival-contingent gross return of  1 + t r
1 1 / ) 1 ( + + + t t r µ  on individual assets  . Because private annuity markets are empirically highly 






1 1 / ) 1 ( t t r 0 ≥ λ  is the 
“charge” on annuities ( 0 = λ  means fair annuities,  1 = λ means no annuities).  
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1−λ ⋅ at. Combined with 
the first order condition  ′  u (ct
1) = ρµt+1 ′  u (ct+1
2 )⋅(1+ rt+1)/µt+1
1−λ = ′  u (ct+1
2 )⋅ ρ(1+ rt+1)µt+1
λ , they 
imply a savings function at = s(1+ rt+1,µt+1)wt. The savings rate   is unambiguously increasing in  s
µt+1, i.e., individuals save more when the life-expectancy rises. 
  To close the model, suppose output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas technology with capital 
share α, full depreciation between generational periods, and an exogenous productivity index γt that 
grows at rate g: 
   Yt =Kt
α(Ntγt)1−α, where γt =γt−1(1+ g) and Nt = Nt−1(1+ nt).   (2) 
Then the capital-labor ratio kt ≡Kt /(Ntγt) determines the interest rate rt =αkt
α−1 −1, the wage 
wt =(1−α)kt
αγt, and all other relevant variables; its dynamics are characterized by 






α . (3) 
As in Diamond (1965), one must assume a positive or “not too negative” interest elasticity of savings 
to ensure uniqueness, dynamic stability, and monotone convergence.  
  How then does demographic change affect welfare? Eq. (3) shows that any reduction in the 
population growth and any increase in the survival rate will raise the capital-labor ratio, and hence 
raise wages and lower interest rates. While higher wages are clearly a plus, lower interest rates are 
negative for savers. A decline in   is definitely welfare-reducing for generation   because it 
reduces 
nt t −1
rt without changing  : This is the U.S. baby boomers’ problem. A rise in  wt−1 µt will also 
reduce  , but assuming people like to live, their utility should nonetheless rise. For all subsequent 
generations   (i ), a lower   and/or a higher 
ct
2
t + i ≥ 0 nt µt are unambiguously positive: One can show 
that their utility increases, provided the economy is dynamically efficient and the model displays 
monotone convergence (0< dkt+1/dkt <1). It is also true that a permanent reduction in population 
growth and/or a permanent increase in µt will increase utility in steady state. Overall, one must 
conclude that (a) the demographic changes observed in the U.S. are basically good news for future 
generations; and (b), lower population growth reduces the welfare of the “last” cohort prior to the 
decline—the baby boomers.  
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3.2. Government Debt and Social Security 
How does government activity modify the above conclusions? From a positive perspective, social 
security and government debt are likely to dampen the macroeconomic effects of demographic change, 
because the existing national debt and social security obligations will impose a lighter (heavier) per-
capita burden on larger (smaller) cohorts. From a normative perspective, a defined-benefits social 
security system therefore provides valuable insurance against demographic changes.  
  To examine the positive role of government, suppose there is a social security system with 
payroll tax θt and benefit rate b , and a fiscal authority that imposes net taxes   on the young and 
 on the old (both expressed as wage-shares). Real government spending is ignored to avoid being 
sidetracked into public finance issues. Government debt must nonetheless be included because social 
security, debt, and direct transfers are close substitutes for purposes of intergenerational redistribution 
(Auerbach et al. 1991). For the U.S., the regular budget is also important because the social security 






  To answer this question, let Dt denote gross Treasury debt and let TRt denote the trust fund, 
both at the start of period t. Initial debt is financed by taxes and new debt, and social security benefits 
and trust fund accumulations are financed by payroll taxes, as captured by the budget equations 





, and  (4) 
  btwtµtNt−1 + (
TRt+1
1+rt+1
−TRt) =θtwtNt. (5) 
Individual consumption values c  and  t
1 = (1−θt −τt
1)wt − at ct+1




1−λ ⋅ at 
depend on taxes and social security only through the total tax rate   and the net benefit rate 








+ (θt + τt
1)wtNt = (Dt −TRt)+ (bt −τt
2)wtµtNt−1  (6) 
and not on its components. The net, or publicly held, debt Dt −TRt is the only relevant measure of 
public liabilities. Capital market equilibrium requires K +(D −TR )/( 1+ r t+1 t+1 t+1 t+1)= atNt, i.e., 
also involves net debt. According to equations (4-6), trust fund redemptions must either be financed by 
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Dt+1 −TRt+1.  
  For our purposes, the most relevant transfer to the old is the general funds subsidy to 
Supplemental Medical Insurance (SMI, a.k.a. Medicare Part B) Hence let  be the 
Medicare subsidy as a share of wages and abstract from other taxes on the old. (Debt and social 
security would be irrelevant if the government could simply tax its creditors, the old; see Bohn 1992.) 




bt = βt + mt
HI βt 
and Hospital Insurance  .  mt
HI
  In the OG model, the macroeconomic effects of alternative policies depend critically on their 
impact on savings and capital accumulation. The case of log-utility, u(c) = ln(c), is most instructive 
here because it yields easily interpretable formulas. Specifically, one finds  























λ).6 Equation (7) provides 
answers about the impact of alternative policies. If dt
+ and dt
++ are held constant, lower population 
growth and higher survival rates will raise the capital-labor ratio, reduce interest rates, and raise 
wages, as in the model without government. 
  At a constant debt-GDP ratio, holding dt
+ constant is equivalent to keeping tax rates constant. 
Social security is, however, a defined-benefits system. With constant benefits,   and  dt
+ dt
++ will 
increase as µt rises and/or nt falls. This implies a crowding-out effect that raises interest rates and 
reduces wages. But unless the fixed benefits are huge, the net effect of the demographic changes is still 
to reduce interest rates and to raise wages, just somewhat less than without a defined-benefits social 
                                                      
6 The variable   is a sum of debt, social security claims, and transfers that can be interpreted as the old cohort’s 




++ is adjusted version that accounts for imperfect 
annuity markets. With perfect annuity markets, all transfers are equivalent and dt
+ is the only relevant policy variable 
(λ = 0 ⇒1−µt
λ = 0 ⇒ dt
++ = dt
+). With imperfect annuities, social security benefits contingent on survival are 
more valuable than other transfers (λ > 0 ⇒1−µt




security system.7 One may conclude that a defined-benefit social security system dampens the 
macroeconomic effects of demographic change, without realistically overturning them. Hence one 
should not be overly concerned about the economic viability of U.S. social security as a defined-
benefits system. 
  One caveat concerns distortionary taxation. At fixed benefits, tax rates would rise as µt rises 
and  nt falls, perhaps triggering increased tax-avoidance. Feasibility may become an issue as one 
approaches the peak of the Laffer curve. This is a valid concern in theory, but a remote possibility for 
the U.S., since the total U.S. tax burden is well below that of many other countries (Hansson and 
Stuart, 2002). Hence, I do not attempt to model the Laffer curve nor tax distortions. Another caveat 
relates to growth in Medicare spending, which increases dt
+ and therefore reduces the capital labor-
ratio, depresses wages, and raises interest rates; because Medicare growth has these effect, it is 
examined more closely in the next section.  
3.3. The Rising Cost of Medical Care 
Medical cost are worth modeling separately, because they are the fastest growing component of social 
security and because health insurance raises separate efficiency issues. Does Medicare create viability 
problems? 
  For the analysis, I reinterpret old-age consumption in the two-period OG model as a CES-
composite of health care consumption ht+1 and “regular” consumption ct+1





ε ]1/ε, (8) 
where 1/(1−ε) is the elasticity of substitution and ηt+1 parameterizes the weight of medical care in 
utility. Empirically, medical needs are strongly correlated with age, suggesting that ηt+1
                                                     
 will increase 
over time as life expectancy rises. Working-age medical cost are omitted because they do not affect 
social security (ignoring disability). 
 
7 This is consistent with the calibration results in Bohn (2001). Additional support is provided by simulation evidence in 
larger-scale models, notably De Nardi et al. (1998). De Nardi et al. simulate alternative policies in a 69-period OG model 
over the period 1975-2060 and show that interest rates decline in every scenario.  
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  Retiree medical care is funded by three sources, payroll taxes covering Hospital Insurance, 
general taxes subsidizing Medicare SMI (about 75% of SMI cost), and payments by the retirees 
themselves. Let  pt be the exogenous relative price of medical services, let   and   be the real 
medical services provided by HI and SMI, and let   be privately-funded 
medical services. Medicare cost as share of the wage are then   and 














  , as before, and  (9)  ct




* = βwt+1 + (1+ rt+1)/µt+1⋅ at.   (10) 
To simplify, I assume log-utility over   and  ct
1 ct+1
2 , and—as efficiency benchmark—perfect annuities. 







2 )ε(1+ rt+1), (11) 









1−ε is a composite of demand (η) and price ( ). This composite also 





  It is a non-trivial exercise to translate the policy debate about the “cost explosion” in Medicare 
into a preference-technology framework. While it seems undisputed that demand (η) is rising rapidly 
as result of new treatment options, the role of price changes is more obscure. Some argue that rising 
relative prices ( ) combined with a low elasticity of substitution contribute to the observed growth in 
medical spending (Cutler 1997). But it is difficult to believe that rapid technical progress would not 
lead to declining relative prices if one properly adjusted for quality improvements. In any case, it 




  The latter is the main point: In response to rising life-expectancy and improvements in 
medical technology, a growing share of medical spending within overall consumption is efficient. 
Thus, projections like Fig. 7 that show unending growth in medical spending are not per se evidence 
of inefficiency. Like increases in µt in the previous section, increases in   will increase individual 




does not prove inefficiency; to the contrary, it would be inefficient to keep the economy on a balanced 
growth path. 
  One must recognize, however, that Medicare spending growth beyond the efficient amount, or 
a wasteful use of Medicare revenue, is problematic. Indeed, much of the Medicare policy debate seems 
to be about moral hazard—the incentives of insured patients to overuse medical services (see Cutler 
1997). As discussed in Bohn (1999), a failure to address moral hazard could threaten the system’s 
economic feasibility. Perhaps worse, moral hazard creates a political economy dilemma: To convince 
voters that future benefits are secure, social security is likely to require some “rigidity” in the name of 
precommitment. Voters may interpret “unfair” cost controls as a breach of an intergenerational 
commitment—as a signal that social security cannot be trusted. Discretionary interventions to resolve 
moral hazard may therefore destroy the system’s political viability. A failure to intervene, on the other 
hand, results in wasteful spending and adversely affects voters cost-benefit calculations. 
4. The Political Economy of Social Security 
From the perspective of voting theory, the existence of social security is a mystery. Since retirees are a 
minority, standard median voter arguments imply that workers should not let themselves be taxed for 
the benefit of the retirees. To rationalize social security in a democracy, the key task is to explain why 
a substantial fraction of workers vote in favor of social security. 
  The literature has provided several explanations. The most prominent ones are based on 
intertemporal considerations and altruism. Intertemporal models build on the fact that individual social 
security benefits are linked to past contributions. Hence, workers may be induced to vote in favor if 
they expect future benefits that outweigh the payroll tax. This argument is consistent with the political 
rhetoric surrounding social security, but it is logically tricky. If there is a sequence of votes, each 
about whether or not to pay a transfer to current retirees, it is not obvious why current voters should 
care about past voting outcomes. By the same logic, current workers should not expect future voters to 
compensate them for their current support of social security. The centerpiece of virtually all 
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intertemporal models of social security is therefore an expectational linkage between current and 
future voting outcomes. 
  I will examine models of this kind below. The focus is on pure age-dependent voting. This is 
not to deny other considerations, but to document that intertemporal arguments alone can provide 
majority support for social security. 
  While early intertemporal models such as Browning (1975) and Boadway and Wildasin 
(1989a,b) simply assume static expectations, recent models have used an explicitly game-theoretic 
reasoning that imposes sequential rationality—notably, Cooley and Soarez (1996, 1999). The task is to 
show that an equilibrium with social security is a sequential equilibrium in an infinitely repeated 
voting game. The critical support mechanism is provided by trigger strategies. The failure of any 
cohort to adhere to the proposed equilibrium triggers a negative change in voters’ expectations about 
future benefits that destroys social security. Since survival and collapse are discrete alternatives, 
trigger strategy models provide a natural definition of what is meant by social security being viable.8
  Since the U.S. social security system is a defined-benefit system, I will assume throughout this 
section that a collapse would be triggered by a failure to pay promised benefits to old. The main steps 
in determining the viability of the system are then  
(a) to sort voters by age, to determine the age of the median voter; and 
(b) to determine if the median-age voter would keep social security under the working assumption 
that the system is viable in the future. 
                                                      
8 There is a long literature on intertemporal models. Aaron (1966) first suggested that median-aged voters compare their 
contributions to the present value of future benefits, treating past contributions as sunk. Hu (1982) recognized the re-voting 
problem. Sjoblom (1985) presents a first model of social security as a dynamic game. Note that one can give the early static-
expectations models (where voters believe the current system will remain in place for their lifetimes) a modern game-
theoretic interpretation, because a static majority for social security at all times means that the system is supported by the 
simple trigger strategy of voting in favor as long as all prior votes have gone in favor. Kotlikoff et al.’s (1988) generational 
contracting explanation for social security is differently motivated, but represents a similar approach. Kotlikoff et al. assume 
that cohorts pass on a “generational contract” obliging each generation to receive benefits from their successor. The 
assumption that non-payment by the young invalidates the “contract” is essentially a trigger mechanism. 
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If these two conditions are satisfied now and in the future, there is sequential equilibrium with a 
majority for social security.  
4.1. How Old Is the Median Voter? 
Without altruism, voters decide about social security by comparing the present value of benefits to the 
present value of their own current and future contributions. Retirees are obviously in favor. Workers 
will be increasingly in favor as they approach retirement age. To obtain a majority for social security, 
benefits must be high enough for the median-age voter that they outweigh the remaining contributions. 
To determine the relevant present values, the first question is: How old is the U.S. median voter? 
  Figure 8 shows the U.S. age distribution for 2001, and the steady-state age distributions for 
0.0% and 0.5% population growth. The comparison highlights the baby boom phenomenon. As of 
2001, the median age of the U.S. voting-age population was 43 years. This estimate might be too low, 
however, because voter registration and actual voter participation are positively correlated with age. 
Table 1 shows the raw population shares of different age groups and the shares of voters that were (a) 
registered to vote and (b) actually voted in recent elections. If one assumes that voting participation 
within age-groups is constant, the median age of actual voters is around 46-47. These numbers should 
be interpreted cautiously, however, because the young might start to vote more in the future if social 
security becomes more burdensome. 
  Table 2 illustrates how the age of the median voter will rise over time as the U.S. population 
ages and the baby boom passes through retirement. Two estimates are provided for each year, one 
based on population size and one corrected for age-dependent participation rates. The raw median is 
more conservative because it does not rely on the empirical correlation of age and voter participation. 
But the corrected number is more accurate if voter participation remains unchanged.  
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Figure 8 
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Notes: Actual distribution from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2002. Steady states from SSA Period Life Table 
for 1999 and own calculations, assuming unchanged mortality. 
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Table 1: How Old Is the U.S. Median Voter?    
 
Age Groups  Voting-age     Percent of Age Group that is: 
 Population  Registered  Voting  Registered 
  (2001)  Nov.2000 Nov.2000 Nov.1998 
18-20  12.3%  40.5% 28.4% 32.1% 
21-24  15.6%  49.3% 35.4% 35.0% 
25-34  39.6%  54.7% 43.7% 52.4% 
35-44  45.0%  63.8% 55.0% 62.4% 
45-64  64.5%  71.2% 64.1% 71.1% 
65+  35.3%  76.1% 67.6% 75.4% 
Voters  65+  16.6%  19.8% 20.5% 20.4% 
Voters  45+  47.0%  53.6% 56.1% 55.4% 
Median  Voter  43  46 47 47 
 
Notes: From Statistical Abstract of the United States (2002) and own calculations. To compute the age of the 
median voter, voter participation is assumed constant within each age bracket. Several elections are listed because 
voter participation varies: Nov.2000 refers to the most recent Presidential election (registration and voting data). 
Nov.1998 refers to the Congressional election (registration only; voting data not available). 
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Table 2: How old are likely median voters in the future? 
 
 Equal  Participation    Participation as in Nov.2000   
Year  Median Voter  Share 65+  Median Voter  Share 65+ 
2003 44 16.7% 47 19.8% 
2010 46 17.4% 49 20.6% 
2020 47 21.7% 51 25.3% 
2030 48 26.3% 52 30.5% 
2040 48 26.8% 52 31.1% 
2050 48 26.6% 52 30.9% 
Zero Growth  48  24.8%       
 
Notes: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2002; SSA Period Life Table for 1999; and own calculations, using 
SSA (2003) intermediate assumptions about increasing survival rates.  
 
  As the baby boomers age, the median age rise from 43 to 48. Age 48 is also the median of the 
0%-growth steady-state distribution in Figure 8. If U.S. population growth is near zero in the long-run, 
as projected by the SSA beyond 2030, this limiting distribution provides a conservative estimate of the 
post-baby boom median age (conservative, because life-expectancy is likely to increase). At historical 
participation rates, the age of the median voter will rise from 46 to 52 by 2030 and stabilize at this age. 
4.2. Voting Decisions 
This section examines how voters’ net present value of social security depends on age and on various 
modeling assumptions. In contrast to Cooley and Soarez (1999), I assume voters take interest rates and 
wages as given. This partial equilibrium analysis is instructive because it allows a more detailed 
modeling of the life-cycle than a more parsimonious general equilibrium model. As explained below, 
endogenous factor prices can only strengthen voter support for social security, so the fixed rate 
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assumption is conservative. A partial equilibrium analysis also provides a useful perspective on how 
voters should evaluate social security in an open economy. 
  The setting is a “many-period” OG model with stochastic survival. Cohort t  enters the 
workforce at time t  and consists of Nt members. Age is indexed by    i =1,K,Imax, with upper bound 
Imax. The unconditional survival probability to age i is µt,i. Over time, the size of cohorts grows at a 
time-varying rate nt = Nt /Nt−1−1. One may interpret this setting as a time-disaggregated version of 
the OG model of Section 3. The retirement age Iret < Imax is assumed exogenous.  To focus on 
intertemporal issues, I abstract from within-cohort heterogeneity. All workers of the same cohort earn 
the same wage and all retirees of the same cohort obtain the same benefits.9
  The net present value of social security is computed by discounting sequences of benefits bt,i
*  
and taxes θt,i
* , to be specified below. Let   be the set of discount factors for  Pt,j
i j-period-ahead 







* wt+ j >0. (13) 
For individuals of age i < I , the net present value of benefits is   ret
  NPVt,i





* ei+ jwt+ j]+ Pt,Iret−i
i ⋅ NPVt+Iret−i,Iret
* . (14) 
where   are the relative earnings of an age- ei+ j (i+ j) worker. Because the years after median-age are 
empirically years with relatively high earnings, age-earnings variations are a likely negative for social 
security and therefore deserve to be modeled. 
  Going backwards a year, benefits are discounted and a year of contributions is deducted. 






                                                      
9 Homogeneity is a conservative assumption. Given the skewness of the income distribution and given a benefit formula 
biased towards lower incomes, voter support for social security is likely strengthened by heterogeneity (see Section 5). The 
ramifications of variable family structure—differences in benefits for single, married, and widowed participants—are left for 
future research. 
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The recursion implies that if NPVt+1,i+1
* < 0 for any age i, then NPVt,i
* < 0 at all younger ages. 






* > 0) or NPVt,1
* > 0, which means that even workers entering the labor force anticipate net 
benefits. (If the latter were true for all cohorts, social security would be beneficial in the Pareto sense, 
an unlikely scenario for the U.S.) 




(including the employer share). These taxes pay for retirement benefits βt,i and HI benefits mt,i
HI to 
individuals of age i ≥ Iret, and for disability benefits to ages i < Iret. If voters view the entire system 
as a unit, they will weigh the sum of taxes against the sum of benefits. If not, each component must 
prove its own viability. 10 Since the latter is a more stringent requirement, I will examine OASI and HI 
separately. I exclude disability insurance from most calculations (except for robustness checks) 
because taxes and benefits involve the same working-age cohorts. I similarly exclude SMI because it 
is financed from general revenues. 
  Social security benefits vary over time and over age-groups. Retirement benefits are indexed 
to aggregate wages until age 60 and inflation-indexed thereafter. If real wages are growing, the 
replacement rate in terms of current wages is declining over time, βt,i =βt+Iret−i,Iret ⋅ wt+Iret /wt+i. 
From 2003 to 2027, the regular retirement age is scheduled to increase from 65 to 67. I capture this by 
varying  Iret over time, which leaves replacement rate at retirement, βt+Iret,Iret, roughly constant. The 
value of medical benefits is, in contrast, rising with age and increasing over time.  
  It is not obvious how individuals value survivors benefits. To be conservative, I exclude 
survivor benefits from the benchmark calculations—also consistent with the assumed absence of 
                                                      
10 Game-theoretically, the issue is whether or not a failure to pay one type of benefits would trigger a shift in expectations 
about all categories of future benefits in the sense of Cooley and Soarez (1996, 1999). In Kotlikoff et al.’s (1988) contracting 
context, the equivalent question is if there is one comprehensive social contract or separate social contracts for OASI and for 
Medicare. 
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altruism—and weigh the total OASI contributions against the “OAI” benefits paid to workers and their 
families during the worker’s lifetime. 11
  Also to be conservative, I will not rely on trust fund sales to sustain promised benefits in 
excess of payroll taxes. The benchmark assumption, to determine if the existing defined-benefit 
system is viable, is that future payroll taxes will be increased to match the projected cost whenever the 
cost rate exceed the current contribution rate.12 Throughout, taxes on benefits are treated as benefit 
reductions and not as revenues; this is economically appropriate but differs from SSA accounting.  
  For discounting taxes and benefits, I follow the SSA Intermediate Projection and assume a 3% 
real interest rate. The discount rate is important because a too low discount rate would overstate the 
NPV of future benefits. The SSA value is above observed market yields on inflation-indexed Treasury 
bonds (below 2.7% at all maturities as of April 2003) and therefore yields conservative NPV 
estimates. Higher discount rates are considered in the sensitivity analysis. 
  With these assumption, what are the critical ages   for the various U.S. transfer programs? 
And how are they likely to change as the U.S. population ages?  
i*
                                                      
11 This is perhaps overly conservative, not only because most people have some level of concern for their closest relatives, 
but also because spouses vote and because the relevant decision unit may well be the family. Moreover, federal law requires 
spousal consent for married workers to choose single-life annuities (Diamond 1998), so that even in a model of selfish 
workers, survivor benefits should not be excluded when one compares the return on social security with the return on 
annuitized private savings. 
12 The specific assumptions about taxes are inessential, provided social security pays all promised benefits. Then workers 
will face rising taxes, either explicitly through higher payroll taxes or indirectly through higher general taxes (e.g., to redeem 
trust fund securities). In the sensitivity analysis below, I also examine voter support for social security with constant tax rates 
and proportionally reduced benefits.  
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Table 3: At What Age Are Voters Starting to Benefit from Social Security? 
Benchmark Values 
 
Year OASI  HI  OASDI 
2003  38 25 41 
2010  39 26 42 
2020  41 29 44 
2030  42 30 45 
2040  42 31 45 
2050  42 32 45 
2030 Age 65  41  30  44 
 
Notes: The table entries are the critical ages i  at which the NPVs of projected taxes and benefits turn positive, all based on 
SSA intermediate projections. Whenever cost exceed revenues under current law, payroll taxes are assumed to rise as 
necessary to cover PAYG cost. Normal retirement age is assumed, except in the last row, which shows age 65 (early) 
retirement in 2030. 
*
OASI: Weighs retirement benefits against OASI taxes, assuming a zero value of survivor benefits. 
HI: Weighs hospital insurance benefits against HI taxes, excluding the disability component. 
OASDI: Weighs retirement benefits against OASDI taxes, assuming a zero value of survivor and disability benefits. 
 
  Table 3 provides answers for a set of benchmark calculations. The economic and demographic 
assumption are taken from the SSA Intermediate Projection. To be conservative, I further assume a 
zero value of survivor benefits, average lifetime earning (i.e. above median), retirement at the normal 
retirement age (except in the final row), and no correction for incomplete annuities. Table 3 shows that 
the critical ages   for OASI and HI are rising over time as the baby boom generation retires, but they 
remain well below the corresponding median ages shown in Table 2. Even if one added the cost of 
disability insurance to retirement insurance and assumed a zero value of benefits, the critical ages 
i*
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remain below the median age, as shown under OASDI. Since all columns show values below the 
median age, the NPVs are also positive if one treated old-age retirement, HI, and/or DI as a unit.13
  Table 4 provides critical age values for the SSA’s High Cost and Low Cost projections and for 
a scenario with fixed tax rates and pro-rated benefits. Interestingly, the High Cost scenario yields more 
near-term voter support for social security and Medicare than the Intermediate or (even less) the Low 
Cost scenario. Intuitively, rising benefits increase the ratio future benefits to current payments, 
provided the system remains viable—then everyone likes to be in the first generation that receives new 
benefits. This logic applies to, and largely explains, the variation in critical ages across the High, 
Intermediate, and Low Cost scenarios, the variations over time as the baby boom passes through, and 
it explain the very low critical ages for HI (as health care cost are expected to rise). After 2030, when 
the baby boom effect has largely vanished, the High, Low, and Intermediate Cost scenarios yield 
similar critical ages for OASI and a more narrow range of i -values for HI.   *
  Because expansion helps, the Fixed-Tax-Rates calculations serves as an instructive “worst 
case” scenario: For OASI, the critical ages are slightly higher than with defined benefits, but they 
remain below the median age, suggesting that the “expansionist” logic is not a major factor, except 
perhaps before 2030 and in the High Cost scenario. For HI, holding tax rates fixed is more important 
because fixed rates would require severe cuts in benefits (e.g., 46% reduction by 2030, 75% by 2030) 
that raise the i -values significantly. In all cases, the critical values nonetheless remain below the 
respective median values in Table 2. 
*
                                                      
13 Even if SMI were included and one arbitrarily assumed that the entire SMI cost falls on workers through general taxes 
subsidizing SMI (and a zero value of DI and survivors insurance), the critical age for the entire HI+SMI system would not 
exceed age 37. For close cases, note that the viability condition is still satisfied when i equals the median age, because  is 
determined by the NPV at the start of the year. 
* i*
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Table 4: Alternative Projections 
 
  Low Cost    High Cost    Fixed Tax Rates   
Year  OASI HI OASI HI OASI HI 
2003  41 43 34  *  42 43 
2010  42 42 35  *  43 44 
2020  42 37 38 23 43 44 
2030  43 31 39 28 43 44 
2040  42 29 40 31 42 44 
2050  42 29 41 33 42 44 
2030 Age 65  42 31 39 28 42 44 
 
Notes: Entries are critical ages   at which NPVs turn positive, as in Table 3, except for the following changes:  i*
Low cost = Based on SSA low cost projection. 
High cost = Based on SSA high cost projection.  
Fixed tax rates = SSA intermediate projection, but whenever benefit cost exceed revenues under current law, benefits are 
reduced proportionally to keep payroll taxes frozen at 2003 levels. 
Stars (*) denotes cases where the NPV is positive for all age groups, due to high projected growth in benefits. 
 
  Table 5 examines the sensitivity of critical age values to specification issues. To save space, 
this is done only for 2030, the peak of the baby boom retirement. To start, note that the calculations 
are robust against a substantial number of changes. Social security looks better if workers value the 
survivors component (line 1) or if one includes an explicit surcharge of λ =0.25 on private annuities 
(line 2). It looks worse, if Medicare is inefficient (line 3), if one considers a high-income worker (line 
4) or if voters are males with lower survival rates than females (line 5). In case of high income 
workers, the increase in   for HI is large but i remains far below the median age of 48. With this 
exception, all these changes are minor in comparison to the next two.  
i* *
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Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
  Scenarios and Assumptions:    Critical Ages i for:  *  
     OASI  HI 
  Benchmark Values for 2030:    42  30 
A. Changes with relatively minor impact:      
1  Voters value OASI Survivor Insurance    37  N/A 
2  Imperfect annuities: 25% surcharge over the 
actuarially fair level 
 40  23 
3  Inefficient Medicare: 80% Value/cost    N/A   37 
4  High income: Reduced replacement rate at 160% of 
average wage 
 45  43 
5  Lower survival: Male life table    44  35 
B. Latent Altruism: i  declines  *     
6  Unavoidable welfare cost 20%    37  * 
7  Unavoidable welfare cost 40%    29  * 
C. Higher Discount rates: i  increases  *     
8  Real rate r = 5%     49?  44 
9  Real rate r = 6%     51?  47 
10  r = 5% & Welfare cost = 20%    46 43 
11  r = 6% & Welfare cost = 40%    45 42 
12  r = 5% & Annuity surcharge = 50%    46 39 
13  r = 6% & Annuity surcharge = 100%    45 36 
 
Notes: Entries are critical ages   at which NPVs turn positive, as in Table 3, but with modified assumptions as noted, 
all for votes taken in the year 2030. Stars (*) denotes cases where the NPV is positive for all age groups. A question 
mark (?) indicates that a majority for the program is questionable because the value exceeds 48, the median age in 
2030, but remains below 52, the median age of registered voters in 2030 based on the Nov.2000 registration pattern. 
i*
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  The first critical issue is whether or not a vote against social security really ends all payments 
to the old. By abstracting from altruism, this is implicitly assumed. But if a substantial fraction of the 
old would be destitute without social security, a small amount of latent altruism (not operational when 
social security operates) would be sufficient for voters to maintain some welfare support. This would 
significantly reduce the benefits of voting against social security.14 Lines 6-7 show how the critical 
ages decline if just 20-40% of social security cost are unavoidable. Under current law, retirees without 
income are entitled to Supplemental Social Security (SSI) and Medicaid benefits. SSI benefits to 
individuals amount to about 20% of average wages, i.e., about half of the OASI replacement rate for 
average earners. If one views SSI as revealing voter preferences towards poverty, it suggests that 
terminating social security would avoid only about half the cost, even less than I assume in lines 6-7. 
If so, OASI has positive NPV for voters age 29 and older, and HI has positive NPV for everyone, 
suggesting an overwhelming majority support for social security. 
  The second critical issue is the discount rate. For discount rates in the 5-6% range—e.g., 
motivated by stock returns, naively disregarding risk—the critical age rises towards the median (lines 
8-10). But even then, majority support for social security remains solid if one uses somewhat less 
conservative assumptions along other dimensions of the model, e.g., a small unavoidable welfare cost 
(lines 11-12) or imperfect annuities (lines 13-14).15 It is nonetheless clear that the support for social 
security is weakened if individuals become convinced that private savings will deliver huge real 
returns. Excessive optimism about the stock market is therefore a problem for social security, and this 
may explain the popularity of social security reform during the 1990s stock market boom. 
                                                      
14 The history of Cooley and Soarez (1996) paper highlights the relevance of this issue: In a draft circulated at the Carnegie-
Rochester conference, they argued that social security is not viable assuming all cost are avoided by a no vote. In the 
published version, they assert that the old simply cannot be cut off at all, and find--not surprisingly--that social security is 
viable. The existence of general welfare raises some deeper issues, however, notably about the need for forced savings to 
avoid moral hazard. 
15 As motivation, note that private annuities are typically fixed income products. A real return on private savings in the 5-6% 
range presumably requires significant stock market investments. Hence, the higher return one assumes, the less plausible it is 
to assume annunitization. Risk-adjustment is beyond the scope of this deterministic model. 
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  Overall, the results strongly suggest that social security is viable. The NPV of social security 
is positive for a majority of the voting population even under quite adverse assumptions, and positive 
for an overwhelming majority under reasonable assumptions. Compared to the results with 1997 SSA 
projections reported in Bohn (1999), the critical age values here are equal or lower than the 
corresponding values previously reported. A major reason for the lower values is the decline in real 
interest rates (3.7% in Bohn 1999 vs. 3% here), but it is not the only one, because much has changed. 
Most importantly, the conclusions about viability remain unchanged and appear robust, not contingent 
on a particular vintage of SSA projections. 
4.3 General Equilibrium Considerations 
General equilibrium issues are examined in more detail in Bohn (1999) and in Cooley and Soarez 
(1996, 1999). Endogenous interest rates do change the calculus for voting decisions. Namely, if social 
security crowds out capital and raises interest rates, a termination of social security will increase 
capital accumulation and thereby reduce interest rates. Voters who understand this linkage will realize 
that a successful no vote would reduce the return on their own retirement savings. They are more 
likely to support social security than voters who employ partial equilibrium reasoning. The partial 
equilibrium estimates of voter support for social security are therefore conservative. General 
equilibrium considerations can only strengthen voter support for social security.16  
4.4. What Could Go Wrong? 
Though the analysis above presents a strong case for the viability of social security, it would be 
unbalanced if I did not discuss some important caveats. This section focuses on multiple equilibria and 
uncertain medical cost, the two issues that I consider most troubling for the U.S. 
                                                      
16 The capital accumulation effect is also a common argument for why “privatizing” social security would be good for the 
U.S. economy. Advocates of privatization do not seem to realize that for savers, lower interest rates are an argument against 
privatization. General equilibrium argument also provide endogenous upper bounds on the size of social security; this is 
discussed in Bohn (1999) and omitted here. 
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  The first concern is that a repeated voting game with trigger strategies has a huge number of 
sequential equilibria supported by different expectations. Intertemporal, trigger-type models of social 
security assume that voters agree on how to form expectations about future votes. Some variations in 
voting strategies could probably be accommodated (presumably anything that keeps the median voter 
in place). But the widespread skepticism about U.S. social security among the young suggests that a 
major shift in expectations cannot be ruled out.  
  To think about changing expectations, one might imagine an evolutionary process where some 
fraction of each new cohort is born with “mutant” expectations. The most interesting mutation would 
be the belief that future voters will abolish social security just when oneself reaches old age. If only a 
small fraction of voters hold such beliefs and vote against social security, social security will retain its 
majority and the skeptics will be proven wrong. In this sense, the equilibrium with social security is 
evolutionary stable. But if a large fraction suddenly starts to hold skeptical beliefs, they would be 
proven right. Note, however, that the popular skepticism about social security seems concentrated in 
the under-30 age group. These cohorts are irrelevant in the median voter context, provided they have 
learned about the stability of the system by the time they reach their 40s.17  
  The second significant concern is about uncertainty, notably about uncertain Medicare cost in 
a setting where voters view Medicare as an unconditional promise to subsidize all medically justified 
care regardless of cost. The political viability of such a system requires that future median voters 
receive a higher expected utility with than without Medicare in all states of nature, and this 
requirement may be violated if doubts develop about the systems ability to pay off in the highest cost 
state. (See Bohn 1999 for more analysis.) Thus Medicare is arguably the most problematic part of the 
overall social security system. 
                                                      
17 Another stabilizing factor is the built-in inertia of the U.S. political system. To change an entitlement program, one needs 
a majority in the House, the Senate, and approval by the President; they often represent different parties. Hence, a repeal of 
social security may in effect require a super-majority; see Hansson and Stuart (1988) for the implications.  
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5. Additional Considerations: Income Inequality and Altruism 
The previous section has focused on purely intertemporal considerations. This section briefly 
comments on two other issues, intra-cohort income inequality and altruism, that are also likely to 
influence voting decisions on social security. (Additional issues are discussed in Bohn 1999.) 
  Within-cohort heterogeneity is important because social security promises a replacement rate 
that declines with income. This is illustrated in Figure 9. Figure 9(a) shows that retirement benefits 
under current law are a concave function of average lifetime wages. Figure 9(b) shows the implied 
negative relationship between income and replacement rates. Income-independent Medicare benefits 
are an even better deal for low-income workers. Conditional on viability in the future, low-income 
workers will therefore vote for social security at a much younger age than predicted in Tables 3-5, 
while high-income earners will not be supportive until a higher age. (For the latter, Table 5, line 4 
provides an upper bound.) Given a skewed income distribution, more than 50% of a cohort has below 
average incomes. Hence income inequality is likely to increase the voter support for social security. 
  Altruism is important because in the presence of an altruistically motivated welfare system, 
social security cannot be terminated without increasing the cost of welfare. As noted the intertemporal 
model above, this reduces workers’ incentives to vote against social security. More strikingly, 
Tabellini (1990) has shown that altruism alone may suffice to rationalize social security, without any 
intertemporal arguments. Tabellini considers an OG model with heterogeneous within-cohort incomes 
and mutual altruism between parents and children. In his model, a coalition of all the old plus the low-
income young can provide a majority for social security. The young poor vote in favor, because their 
wage-proportional tax is small and they have altruistic feelings towards their parents.  
  In summary, intertemporal arguments, income inequality, and altruism provide a multitude of 
mutually reinforcing reasons for voters to support social security. While Section 4 has shown that 
intertemporal arguments alone are sufficient to obtain majority support, this is not to deny the 
relevance of other factors. 
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Figure 9 
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Despite all the concerns about social security, my economic and voting analysis concludes that the 
system is almost certainty viable. The U.S. median voter is currently about 43-46 and will be about 48-
52 at the peak of baby-boom retirement. Under a variety of assumptions and cost-benefit projections, 
the net present value of social security is reliably positive for the critical age range. The system’s 
viability is further reinforced by altruism, imperfect private annuity markets, within-cohort 
redistribution, and other considerations, but such additional considerations are not even necessary.  
  The most serious caveats to this conclusion are about self-confirming skepticism within the 
population and about Medicare’s potential inability handle moral hazard problems effectively. Since 
retirees are a minority, a majority for social security requires the support of a significant fraction of 
working-age voters. As long as middle-aged voters believe that for a few more years of contributions, 
they earn retirement and medical benefits for the rest of their lives, their support can probably be taken 
for granted. This might change, however, if a substantial fraction of the over-45 age group started to 
believe that social security is doomed.  
  Given these concerns and the alarming projected cost increases, it is remarkable that the 
current political debate is about adding drug benefits to Medicare, not about cost-cutting. This suggest 
that neither politicians nor most voters are overly concerned about the system’s viability, and this is 
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